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Recent years have seen large swings in house prices in many countries. Moti-
vated by housing price variations, proposals for taxing capital gains on housing have
repeatedly been put forth. The idea seems to be that such taxes would curb the
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the market for owner-occupied housing. Our paper shows that at least in simple
settings, a tax on real capital gains on housing will only lead to even bigger price
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1 Introduction
House prices are known for displaying large swings in all industrialized countries. In recent
years, where these countries have experienced moderate to high rates of growth, house
prices have risen substantially.1 Of course, such price hikes have led to large capital gains
for existing house-owners while at the same time making it more di¢ cult for potential
new owners to enter the market.
Worried by this state of a¤airs, politicians and laymen in many countries have re-
peatedly called for the introduction of a tax on such capital gains from housing. Table 1
gives an overview of the current tax treatment of capital gains from investment in housing
in the EU. Although there is taxation of capital gains from housing in most countries,
there are many exemptions, in particular for owner-occupied housing; as a result, one can
expect capital gains on owner occupied housing to go untaxed in most cases.
- Table 1 here -
Sometimes it has been unclear whether the proposals for taxation of capital gains
meant taxation of nominal or real (i.e. corrected for ination in the general price level)
capital gains. In any case, many economists have been among the proponents of capital
gains taxation on housing. All the same, other economists have regarded such taxation
a bad idea. Arguments for or against have not always been clear, but proponents tend
to argue that by taxing capital gains it becomes possible to redistribute from those ex-
periencing the gains to those that have to enter the owner-occupied housing market at
high price levels. Furthermore, some have even claimed that capital gains taxation might
reduce the swings in prices in the housing market.
An example can be found in the 1999 OECD Economic Survey of Denmark, OECD
(1999). OECD notes (on p. 96) that while the Danish tax system embodies a parallel
1For example, the house price index has in the period 1993-99 increased in real terms by about 50 per
cent in Denmark and more than 20 per cent in the UK. As an exception, real house prices have in the
same period fallen by around 15 per cent in Japan. See OECD (2000).
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treatment of the two di¤erent components of capital income - interest, rents and dividends
on one hand and (realized) capital gains on the other - this principle is in practice not
applied to residential property, with capital gains and losses upon the sale of a house being
tax-exempt. And later (on pp. 131-32) it says: "From the perspective of the cyclical
evolution of the economy, the absence of a capital gains tax appears to have induced an
important element of cyclicality into the market. ... Indeed, if housing investment were
to be taxed on a par with nancial investment, on a nominal and accrued basis, capital
gains and losses would automatically be subject to taxation, potentially reducing price
uctuations in the housing market."
Those against a tax on capital gains on housing stock point out that at least when
the tax falls on real capital gains it is not likely to bring much revenue in the medium
to long run (as real price increases will be followed by real price drops, and vice versa).
Further, it would be cumbersome to measure such capital gains, and as they would likely
only be levied upon realization, the e¤ective tax on capital gains would depend on the
tenure period. Finally, and related to this, a capital gains tax would cause the usual
lock-in e¤ects normally associated with capital gains taxation.
Surprisingly, there is very little literature on the economic e¤ects of capital gains
taxation on housing. Some studies focus on the way capital gains taxes a¤ect the risk
associated with private homeownership. Rosen, Rosen and Holtz-Eakin (1984) analyze
the impact of capital gains taxation on demand for owner occupied housing in a model
with uncertainty about the user cost of housing. They argue that capital gains taxes
may increase the attractiveness of owner occupied housing because the variance of the
user cost declines. Of course, this comes at the cost of more risky tax revenue. Overall
risk exposure can only be reduced if the government is able to diversify away part of the
risk. She¤rin and Turner (2001) focus on the ability of the government to diversify risk
and point out that house price movements are typically not synchronized across regions.
Therefore a capital gains tax with full loss o¤set may be used as a risk sharing device. In
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both papers, house price movements are taken as given2 whereas the present paper takes
into account that capital gains taxes will typically a¤ect house prices.
Hoyt and Rosenthal (1992) consider the changes in capital gains tax rates in the US due
to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in a setting with a nonlinear (kinked) budget constraint.
The kink was caused by the fact that sellers in the housing market could avoid paying tax
on the capital gain from the sale of their home, if they purchased a more expensive home
when moving. Taking the kink into account Hoyt and Rosenthal establish that a reduction
in the capital gains tax would reduce housing demand (and, presumably, the general level
of house prices). Lundberg and Skedinger (1998) show, using a panel of Swedish home
owners in 1984-90, that lock-in e¤ects due to realization-based capital gains taxation only
appear for households with income reductions. Further, the lock-in e¤ects depend on the
degree of mismatch in the current residence and whether households buy up or buy down
in the market. Englund (1985) studies how accrual- vs. realization-based taxes on capital
gains on owner-occupied homes a¤ect the length of holding periods for homes. He allows
for transactions costs and assumes a given development of house prices.
Of course, housing markets and house prices are shaped by other taxes than those on
capital gains. Lundborg and Skedinger (1999) investigate the implications of transactions
taxes. Seller taxes are found to raise house prices, while buyer taxes lower them, on
account of the interaction of the taxes with lock-in e¤ects. The failure in virtually all
industrialized countries to tax imputed rent on housing at rates similar to capital income
tax rates has triggered a number of theoretical and empirical contributions. Pines, Sadka
and Sheshinski (1985) discuss at length the normative and positive aspects of taxation
of imputed rent on owner-occupied housing. Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) consider a
general equilibrium model of portfolio choice where owner occupied housing is one asset
among others. They consider the e¢ ciency gains which would result from the removal
of tax advantages for owner occupied housing and nd that there would be a gain of
382 US-Dollars for the average household. This gain results from the reallocation of
2She¤rin and Turner (2001) assume that housing services are perfectly elastic in supply.
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capital to sectors with higher before tax rates of return and from the diversication of
risk provided by the tax system. Skinner (1996) computes sizeable dynamic e¢ ciency
costs of conceding preferential tax treatment to housing as compared to physical capital
investment. Finally, Weiss (1978) examines the implications of various taxes, including
di¤erential capital gains taxation of owner-occupiers and landlords, on the choice between
renting or owning.
At least since the important article by Poterba (1984) house prices have been perceived
as asset prices. It is therefore natural to inquire whether there exist studies on the
implications for share price variation of taxation of capital gains associated with ownership
of shares. Specically, do such studies nd that an increase in capital gains taxation leads
to greater stock price volatility? In his famous article on capital gains taxation Stiglitz
(1983) shows that an increase in the capital gains tax rate will increase the volatility
of the stock market. He derives this result from a model with two groups of investors
and two states of nature. In one state, the price of the asset is high and in the other
state, the price of the asset is low. If the state of nature changes, the asset is sold by
one group of investors to the other. How does a capital gains tax a¤ect price volatility in
this framework? If the price of the asset is high, a capital gains tax with full loss o¤set
reduces the capital loss of the investors who have bought at the high price if they sell
the asset later at the low price. Accordingly, the investors who buy the asset if the price
is low will sell the asset at some later date and earn a capital gain. Their valuation of
the asset declines if capital gains taxes are introduced. As a result, capital gains taxes
increase the price of an asset when the price is high and reduce it in states where the price
is already low, i.e. prices become more volatile. The proposition that capital gains taxes
increase price volatility in stock markets has been tested by, inter alia, Noronha and Ferris
(1992) who nd evidence of an increase in stock market volatility following an increase
in the capital gains tax rate. (They seem to attribute their nding to the lock-in e¤ect
associated with realization, though.) Viard (2000) demonstrates that the level of asset
prices is increased following the introduction of realization-based capital gains taxation.
This is to compensate for the lock-in e¤ect and its tendency to dampen the supply of
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assets.
The objective of this paper is to sort out some of the issues related to taxing capital
gains on housing. In particular, we focus on the price and distributional e¤ects of capital
gains taxation. We wish to demonstrate that it is easy to imagine circumstances in which
such a tax leads to no redistribution whatsoever and only causes bigger, not smaller,
amplitudes in house price swings. Given that a real capital gains tax is likely to bring
forth close to zero revenue, and that the construction sector likely would become even
more volatile when faced with bigger price swings, it seems di¢ cult to recommend such
a capital gains tax.
We set up a simple overlapping generations model in section 2 and in the subsequent
section 3 consider a clear-cut example with deterministic swings in income which drives
home our main points. The revenue from a capital gains tax can be transferred back
to the private sector in di¤erent ways, but this leads to only minor changes in our basic
result. In section 4 we briey allow for limited loss o¤set; more states; a stochastic income
process; and income growth. Again we show that our basic point remains. Finally, section
5 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 A simple model
In order to capture the fact that there is a denite generational as well as a time dimen-
sion to the debate over capital gains taxation on housing we have decided to apply an
overlapping generations model. The model is deliberately kept as simple as possible; still,
it should contain some of the essentials of any analysis of the e¤ects of taxing real capital
gains on housing.
Consider a small, open economy which is populated by overlapping generations of
constant size N . Each generation lives for two periods; in the rst period a (young)
individual earns an income from production of some non-durable consumer good, while
in the second period the (old) individual has retired and hence earns no labor income.
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Imagine that young individuals live out in the open, while when old they occupy perfectly
divisible houses, of which there altogether are N housing units. The number of housing
units is constant through time.
At the end of their second period, the houses are sold by the old to the young, so that
the latter can live in them in the subsequent period. The income earned by individuals in
their rst period is used for consumption in the same period, purchase of housing units,
plus (net) nancial saving. Individual have full access to an international nancial market,
where they can lend or borrow at the international interest rate. In the second period,
individuals sell their houses, and together with the gross income from saving they nance
their second-period consumption.
Suppressing notation for time and generation, an individual earning an income of y
must thus decide how much to consume in the rst period, c1, how much to save, s, for
the next period, and how many housing units, h, to purchase at the going house price p1
(the subscript referring to the individuals rst period). Non-durable consumption units,
performing the role of numeraire, bear the price of one, so that p1 denotes the relative, or
real, price of housing units. Hence, the rst-period budget constraint becomes
y   c1   p1h = s
In the second period, the individual sells his housing units for the going price of p2
(2referring to his second period). The budget constraint for this period is therefore
c2 = (1 + r)s+ p2h
where r stands for the international rate of interest.
Substituting for saving, we can write the individuals intertemporal budget constraint
as
c2 = (1 + r)[y   c1   p1h] + p2h (1)
Endowed with a utility function u(c1; c2; h)3 and furnished with information about the
3In e¤ect, we assume that one unit of housing stock produces one unit of housing services.
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income process and the housing price process, the individual will select consumption in
the two periods as well as the number of housing units so as to maximize utility.
For the case where the price of housing in the second period is certain, utility maxi-
mization implies
u3
u1
= p1[
r
1 + r
  p
p1(1 + r)
] (2)
where p  p2   p1 denotes the increase in the real price of housing from the rst to
the second period. This rst order condition equates the marginal rate of substitution
between housing and rst period consumption to the nominal user cost of housing.4
Now introduce taxation of capital gains at the rate t. This changes the second period
budget constraint into
c2 = (1 + r)s+ p2h  tph
from which the intertemporal budget constraint becomes
c2 = (1 + r)[y   c1]  h[p1r  p(1  t)] (3)
We see that resources left for second period consumption diminish if the price of housing
rises from the rst to the second period, and the more so, the bigger is the capital gains
tax rate t.
Provided the second period housing price p2 is certain, the rst order condition relating
to the choice of housing relative to rst period consumption can be stated as
u3
u1
= p1[
r
1 + r
  p(1  t)
p1(1 + r)
] (4)
The capital gains term in the (certain) nominal user cost expression is now reduced in line
with the size of the capital gains tax. This statement presumes, however, that housing
prices are not altered by the capital gains tax. In fact, the aim of the following is to show
that this is an untenable assumption instead, both rst and second period house prices
and also the price di¤erence between the two periods will be a¤ected by the presence of
capital gains taxation on housing. This will become clear in the following section.
4The presence of 1 + r in the denominator of the user cost expression derives from the fact that
consumption of housing services takes place one period later than rst period consumption.
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3 Deterministic income swings
3.1 An example
In this example we presuppose that income of the young is deterministic and perpetually
swings between a high level, yu (ufor up), and a low level, yd (dfor down). In other
words, if a given generation experiences a high income level, it knows for sure that the
subsequent generation will enjoy a low income level, just like the generation preceding it
did. It is easily seen that the price of housing will uctuate between two di¤erent values,
too, since history will repeat itself every second period.5 Denote the price of housing units
in periods where the young generation experiences high (low) income by pu (pd).
To make for simple computations, assume that the utility function over rst and second
period consumption and housing services is logarithmic as in6
u(c1; c2; h) = log(c1) + [log(c2) + (1  )log(h)] (5)
in which  denotes the utility discount factor, while  stands for the budget share of
non-durables consumption in total consumption in the second period.
The rst order condition for the choice between c1 and h can now be written
(1  )c1
h
= p1[
r
1 + r
  p(1  t)
p1(1 + r)
]; (6)
where if the income of the young y1 = yu(yd), then p1 = pu(pd), p2 = pd(pu), and
p = pd   pu(pu   pd). Solve this equation for housing stock demanded to get
h =
(1  )c1
p1[
r
1+r
  p(1 t)
p1(1+r)
]
The rst order condition for c1 in combination with the intertemporal budget constraint
implies c1 = y1=(1 + ). The number of housing units per young individual is equal to
one, so that all in all,
1 =
(1  )(1 + r)
[p1r  p(1  t)](1 + )y1
5Ruling out bubble paths in house prices.
6A similar formulation of preferences can be found in Skinner (1996)
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Using how income and house prices gyrate between upand down levels, we can
nally derive the following expressions for house prices in the two states,
pu =
k[(1 + r   t)yu + (1  t)yd]
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 ; p
d =
k[(1 + r   t)yd + (1  t)yu]
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 (7)
where the parameter k is given by k  (1  )(1 + r)=(1 + ).
To get some feeling for these expressions, consider a set of values for the key parame-
ters: r = 0:5,  = 2=3 (reecting that a period in the model may span, say, twenty or thirty
years), yu = 120; yd = 90;  = 2=3. With these parameter values, pu = 43:2; pd = 40:8 in
the absence of taxation, i.e. t = 0. With t at 50 pct., t = 0:5, pu = 44; pd = 40.
As expected, house prices in the up periods exceed those in the down periods,
although not by very much  especially not when compared with the examples huge
variation in incomes between the two states. The reason for the comparatively modest
variation in house prices is exactly that when an individual buys a house in an upperiod
he knows for certain that he will have to sell it in a downperiod. The expectation of a
capital loss raises the user cost of the house, ceteris paribus, thus limiting the price the
individual is willing to o¤er for the house. Conversely in downperiods, where, despite
low income, an individual is ready to o¤er rather much for a house, since he expects to
harvest a capital gain when selling it at next periods higher price.
We can also see directly from (7) how taxation of capital gains will inuence house
prices. While some observers (viz. the reference to the OECD Economic survey of Den-
mark in the introduction) presume that taxing capital gains will limit variation in house
prices, exactly the opposite is true in the present context. House prices will be even higher
in the upperiod and lower still in the downperiod with capital gains taxation. The
reason for this is the following mechanism:
When an individual in an upperiod decides how much he is willing to pay for a
house, he knows that he will have to purchase it dearly and sell it cheaply. However,
with capital gains taxation he will be o¤ered a tax rebate corresponding to the expected
capital loss, so will be able to o¤er more for the house. The seller, knowing that he will
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be taxed on the capital gain that accrues to him (since he sells dearly and has purchased
cheaply in the previous period), will demand a higher price. So the two parties will agree
on a higher price in the upperiod with capital gains taxation than without. Exactly the
opposite holds for the downperiod, where the buyer knows that he will be taxed on a
capital gain later and therefore demands a lower price, while the seller can agree to this,
because there is a tax rebate for his capital loss with capital gains taxation.
Now, the real surprise in this simple example is that capital gains taxation will have
no inuence whatsoever on the (discounted) user cost of housing. Into the formula for
user cost, the right hand side of (4), we insert the two expressions in (7) for house prices
to derive, respectively,
uu =
k
1 + r
yu; ud =
k
1 + r
yd (8)
(where u signies user cost). The important thing to note here is that the user cost is
completely independent of the reigning capital gains tax rate and simply varies propor-
tionately with the income level of the young. The immediate tendency of capital gains
taxation to lower or raise user cost is apparently entirely o¤set by the impact of capital
gains taxation on house prices.
Using the gures above, we can calculate that the user cost in upperiods amounts
to 16, and in downperiods it is equal to 12, regardless of the capital gains tax rate. The
full variation in income levels is preserved in user cost, but not in house prices.
Admittedly, the present model with deterministic income swings is very simple. We
do not see any reason, though, why the mechanisms governing house prices in the model
should not be present in more complicated settings. In the remainder of this section we
incorporate the use of the revenue from capital gains taxation, while in the subsequent
section we consider several extensions of our basic model framework. Still, in all cases we
derive similar e¤ects of capital gains taxation on house prices as above.
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3.2 Using the Tax Revenue
The analysis in the preceding section abstracts from the question of how the revenue from
the capital gains tax is used or how the budget constraint of the public sector is balanced
if capital gains tax revenue is negative. In this section, we consider the case where the
revenue is transferred back to the private sector in a lump sum manner or a decit is
covered by lump sum taxes in each period. Since there is always an old and a young
generation, there are di¤erent possible lump sum transfer schemes. In the following, we
consider two cases. In the rst case, we assume that the transfer paid (or the tax levied)
is the same for all households in a given period. In the second and probably less realistic
case, we assume that the transfer is paid only to (or the tax is paid only by) the old
generation which also pays the capital gains tax in this period.
3.2.1 Equal per capita transfers
Denote the tax revenue in period j by Tj and normalize the number of households in each
generation to unity, N = 1. Then, a household who is young in period j receives a transfer
Tj=2 when young and a transfer Tj+1=2 when old. The second period budget constraint
of the household can now be written as
c2 = (1 + r)[y1   c1 + T1
2
] +
T2
2
  h[p1r  p(1  t)]
Given the utility function in (5), housing demand is given by
h = m
(1 + r)(y1 +
T1
2
) + T2
2
rp1   (p2   p1)(1  t) (9)
where m  (1 )
1+
. Assume again that income swings between an upand a downlevel
as in section 3.1. In this case, the transfer from the government a household receives
in a high income period is T
u
2
= t
2
(pu   pd). In a low income period, the transfer is
T d
2
=   t
2
(pu   pd) . Substituting these expressions into (13) allows to derive the house
prices in the two states:
pu = m(1 + r)
(1 + r   t)yu + (1  t)yd
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 (10)
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and
pd = m(1 + r)
(1 + r   t)yd + (1  t)yu
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 (11)
where   1 + mr
2
.
With the parameter values used in section 3.1., we now nd that the introduction of a
capital gains tax rate of 50% increases the price of housing in upperiod from pu = 43:2 to
pu  44:05 and reduces the price in downperiods from pd = 40:8 to pd  39:95 . We thus
nd that the capital gains tax again increases house price uctuations. It is interesting
to compare these results to the case studied in section 3.1., where we did not take into
account the public sector budget constraint. Our additional assumption that the tax
revenue is redistributed in a lump sum manner further increases house price uctuations,
though only by a small amount. Why does this happen? E¤ectively, the distribution
of the tax revenue on an equal per capita basis in each period favours the high income
households at the cost of low income households. This happens for the following reason.
In high income periods, capital gains tax revenue is positive because prices have increased
compared to the preceding period. This implies that the transfer is also positive. In low
income periods, capital gains tax revenue is negative, so that all households have to pay
a tax. As a result, each household faces a tax in one period of her life and a transfer
in the other period. The di¤erence between high and low income household is that high
income households receive the transfer in the rst period of their life and pay the tax
in the second period, so that the present value of the transfers is positive, whereas it is
negative for low income households.
More formally, the second period value of lifetime government transfers for a high
income household is
1
2
 
T u(1 + r) + T d

=
1
2
tr2m(1 + r)(yu   yd)
[(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2]
For low income households, we have
1
2
 
T d(1 + r) + T u

=  1
2
tr2m(1 + r)(yu   yd)
[(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2]
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Does this also imply that the capital gains tax makes high income households better
o¤, at the expense of low income households? To answer this question, we have to take
into account the possible e¤ects of the tax on the user cost of housing. Substituting (14)
and (15) into the user cost term on the right hand side of (4) yields
uu = myu + t
r2m2(yu   yd)
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 (12)
and
ud = myd   t r
2m2(yu   yd)
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 (13)
In contrast to our results in the preceding sections, it now turns out that the capital
gains tax does inuence the user cost of housing. The user cost of housing is reduced in
low income periods and increased in high income periods. In our numerical example, the
introduction of a capital gains tax with a rate of 50% increases the user cost of housing
in the high income state slightly from uu = 16 to uu = 16:05 . In the low income state,
the user cost of housing falls from ud = 12 to ud = 11:95 .
What does this imply for the overall distributive e¤ects of the capital gains tax? The
indirect utility function of high income households can be written as V = V (Y; u), with
V1(Y; u) =  and V2(Y; u) =  h(1 + r) , where  is the marginal utility of second
period income and Y is the second period value of the households lifetime income (incl.
transfers). For a high income household we have
Y = Y u = yu(1 + r) +
1
2
 
T u(1 + r) + T d

and for a low income household
Y = Y d = yd(1 + r) +
1
2
 
T d(1 + r) + T u

The e¤ect of introducing a capital gains tax, departing from an equilibrium without
taxes is
dV (Y u; uu)
dt
= u
(1 m)m(1 + r)r2(yu   yd)
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 > 0 (14)
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for the high income households and
dV (Y d; ud)
dt
= d
(1 m)m(1 + r)r2(yd   yu)
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 < 0 (15)
for the low income households. It thus turns out that, paradoxically, the high income
households benet from the introduction of a capital gains tax on housing, at the expense
of the low income households.
3.2.2 Transfer to the old generation only
A key factor explaining the adverse distributional e¤ects of the capital gains tax in the
above example is the assumption that the government balances the budget using lump
sum transfers or taxes which are the same for the old and the young generation. As has
been explained above, this policy redistributes from low to high income households. We
now consider the case where the government distributes the capital gains tax revenue in
each period to the generation which pays the tax, i.e. the old generation. In the example
where income swings deterministically between yd and yu, we can derive the following
house prices:
pu = m(1 + r)
(1 + r   t)yu + (1  t)yd
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 (16)
and
pd = m(1 + r)
(1 + r   t)yd + (1  t)yu
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 (17)
where   1 +m. Using the same approach as in the preceding sections, we can derive
the user cost of housing as
uu = myu + t
rm2(yu   yd)
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 (18)
and
ud = myd   t rm
2(yu   yd)
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 (19)
As in the case of equal per capita transfers, the capital gains tax increases the user cost
of housing in upperiods and reduces the user cost of housing in downperiods. Given
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that the transfer policy of the government does not redistribute between generations,
the user cost e¤ects suggest that the capital gains tax should now have less adverse
redistributive e¤ects. Indeed, it turns out that the introduction of a capital gains tax now
reduces the utility of high income households, to the benet of low income households:
dV (Y u; uu)
dt
=  u (1 +m)m
2(1 + r)r(yu   yd)
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 < 0
for the high income households and
dV (Y d; ud)
dt
= d
(1 m)m(1 + r)r2(yd   yu)
(1 + r   t)2   (1  t)2 > 0
for the low income households.
4 Extensions
In this section, we consider three extensions of our basic model. Firstly, we give up
the assumption that there is full loss o¤set. We do so because limited loss o¤set is an
important feature of many real world tax systems. Secondly, we consider a situation with
three states, where income uctuates between a low, a medium and a high level. This
extension has the purpose to investigate whether or main result, the nding that capital
gains taxes increase house price volatility, also holds in a more complex house price cycle,
where households expect further house price increases in booms and vice versa. Thirdly,
we will allow for a simple stochastic income process because uncertainty about future
housing demand may have an impact on house price volatility and tax e¤ects. Finally,
we put forth a few remarks on the implications of income growth.
4.1 Limited loss o¤set
In this section, we change the model considered in section 3.1. by assuming that house-
hold which experience a loss when selling their houses are denied any loss o¤set. It is
straightforward to show that it can only be the rich generations (those experiencing high
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income when young) that will experience a capital loss on their houses over their life
time, and that, conversely, the poor generations will experience a capital gain.7 Then the
second-period consumption of high income households will be given by
c2 = (1 + r)s+ p2h (20)
Even though they experience a housing capital loss, and a capital gains tax is in place,
they will receive no tax rebate. The poor generations second period consumption will be
c2 = (1 + r)s+ p2h  tph (21)
since they will be taxed on their capital gains on housing.
Exploiting the log (Cobb-Douglas) utility function, we may derive two equations for
the price of houses in upand downperiods:
pu(1 + r)  pd = kyu
pd(1 + r   t)  pd(1  t) = kyd
with k  (1  )(1 + r)=(1 + ).
The two equations can be solved to yield
pu =
k
r(2 + r   t) [(1 + r   t)y
u + yd] (22)
pd =
k
r(2 + r   t) [(1  t)y
u + (1 + r)yd] (23)
First note that if t = 0, i.e. there is no capital gains taxation, the expressions for
house prices are the same as in the benchmark model without taxes. Second, substituting
the usual numbers of yu = 120; yd = 90;  =  = 2=3; r = 0:5, a 50 per cent capital gains
tax rate will lead to house prices of pd = 39 and pu = 42.
In a situation without capital gains taxation, the house prices in the upand down
periods were, respectively, 40.8 and 43.2, with a span of 2.4 between them. Capital gains
7Entertaining the opposite assumption will quickly lead to a contradiction.
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taxation without any loss o¤set leads to a widening of this span to 3.0. The increase in
the span is a little less than one half of the full span of 4.0 between downand upprices
with full loss o¤set, where the two price levels were 40 and 44.
Also note that the average level of house prices has gone down from previously 42 to
now 40.5. The reason for this, of course, is that the government collects revenues, but no
longer provides any tax rebates. The average level of house prices (and the span between
the downand uplevels) would increase, if the government were to hand back the capital
gains tax revenue in the form of transfers to the young and old in those periods where
positve capital gains are measured and subjected to tax.
The bottom line of the investigation of limited (in fact, no) loss o¤set in capital gains
taxation on housing is that the mechanism working in the direction of increasing house
price volatility is still in action, although it has lost about half of the full e¤ect under full
loss o¤set. Taking into account the realistic feature that when (and if) capital gains on
housing are taxed, there will not be comparable rebates for capital losses, thus does not
destroy our point: Taxing capital gains on housing will increase the variability of house
prices.
4.2 More states
We now assume that there are three income levels: yd < ym < yu, in the three states
down, medium, up. A deterministic business cycle would now be a movement from
mediumto downto mediumto upto mediumand so forth. While the two medium
positions will have the same income level, they will not have the same house price level,
since they will be followed by bust and boom, respectively. But both medium levels
will have the property that the recent development in house prices will (be expected
to) continue in the future as well. In the upswing from the bust state, the house price
will increase towards the medium state and further on to the boom state, while in the
downswing the decline in the house price will occur from boom to medium and also from
medium to bust.
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To distinguish between the two medium states let us call the medium state following
a bust and preceding a boom m+ and the medium state following a boom and preceding
a bust m . Full loss o¤set in capital gains taxation is assumed, and the use of the tax
revenue is ignored for the moment.
Using the properties of the logarithmic utility function, the house prices in the down
state will be given by
pd(1 + r   t)  pm+(1  t) = kyd
and similar equations will connect pm+ to pu, pu to pm , and pm  to pd. The corresponding
four equations with the four unknown house prices can now be solved to yield
pd = [(1 + r   t)4   (1  t)4] 1k[(1 + r   t)3yd
+(1 + r   t)2(1  t)ym + (1 + r   t)(1  t)2yu + (1  t)3ym];
with a similar solution to the other three prices:
pm+ = [(1 + r   t)3ym + (1 + r   t)2(1  t)yu + (1 + r   t)(1  t)2ym + (1  t)3yd];
pu = [(1 + r   t)3yu + (1 + r   t)2(1  t)ym + (1 + r   t)(1  t)2yd + (1  t)3ym];
pm  = [(1 + r   t)3ym + (1 + r   t)2(1  t)yd + (1 + r   t)(1  t)2ym + (1  t)3yu];
where  = [(1 + r   t)4   (1  t)4] 1k. Now use the same parameter values as above,
and let ym attain the value 105. Then, the four house prices can be calculated to pd =
39:6; pm+ = 43:2; pu = 44:4; pm  = 40:8 with a capital gains tax rate of t=0.5, as opposed
to pd = 40:6; pm+ = 42:9; pu = 43:4; pm  = 41:1 without taxation. Again, we see that the
span between house prices in the downand upperiods, while at 2.8 in the absence of
taxes, increases to 4.8 with capital gains taxation.
We also note the very interesting property that the medium income state will display
two di¤erent levels for the price of houses, depending on whether the state is a stepping
stone in an upswing period, or conversely a stepping stone in a period of downturn. So
while only three income levels are introduced, one must distinguish four di¤erent types of
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generations in accounting for welfare levels of such di¤erent generations, with or without
capital gains taxation.
It is also interesting to consider the case where the medium income level is closer to
one of the two extreme income levels. Assume, for instance, that ym = 114, with all other
parameter values as above. Without capital gains taxes, the housing price cycle reaches its
peak already in the m+ period: we get pd = 42:1; pm+ = 45:1; pu = 44:8; pm  = 43:2. The
result pm+ > pu is due to the fact that households who buy in m+ expect further house
price increases whereas households buying in upperiods expect a decline in prices. These
price change expectations overcompensate the income di¤erence. What is the e¤ect of
capital gains taxation. With t=0.5, we get pd = 40:8; pm+ = 45:6; pu = 45:6; pm  = 43:2.
Again, the capital gains tax increases the span between the highest and lowest prices,
from a value of 3 without taxes to 3.8 with taxes.
To summarize, the analysis of this section reects that house prices are very much
forward-looking. As a result, the house price development accellerates in the early phase of
an upswing and decellerates in the latter phase. Conversely, in the downturn, house prices
drop dramatically in the rst phase of the downturn while subsequently decellerating. The
taxation of capital gains seemingly reinforces this accelleration-decelleration pattern.
4.3 The Role of Uncertainty: An example with credit con-
strained households
So far, we have assumed that income uctuations are deterministic so that individuals
face no risks when making their consumption and saving decisions. We now consider
the case where each generation faces uncertainty about the income of future generations,
which implies that the price at which the housing stock can be sold to the next generation
is also uncertain. We use a simple model of stochastic house price uctuations. As in
the previous section, we assume that each generation lives for two periods. The utility
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function of the representative household is assumed to have the form
c2 + v(h)
with v0 > 0 and v00 < 0. Thus, the individual only consumes in the second period of life
and is risk neutral with respect to second period consumption. We again assume that
households earn an income y1 in the rst period. In each period, this income takes a high
value denoted by yu with probability  or a low value denoted by yd with probability 1 .
These assumptions considerably simplify the analysis. In the rst period, the household
earns a random income y1. Income may be used for savings or purchases of housing units.
The budget constraint of the household is given by
y1 = s+ p1h
Furthermore, we assume that the household faces a credit constraint such that savings
must be non-negative (s  0). In the second period, the household sells the housing unit
for the random price p2, liquidates savings and possibly pays capital gain taxes, so that
second-period consumption is
c2 = (1 + r)s+ p2h  t(p2   p1)h
Expected utility maximization implies the following rst order condition:
E [p2]  t (E [p2]  p1) + v0(h)  (1 + r)p1 (24)
where E [] is an expectations operator. The rst order condition holds as an equality
if the households rst period income y1is su¢ ciently high. In this case, the household
invests in both housing and nancial assets. Since the supply of housing is given, equation
(22) determines the equilibrium price of housing in period 1 for a given expected house
price in period 2, E [p2] . For low values of y1, equation (22) holds as an inequality. The
household spends the entire income on housing. Intuitively, equation (1) then indicates
that the household would like to borrow in order to purchase additional housing in period
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1. However, borrowing is ruled out because of the credit constraint. Assume the credit
constraint is binding if and only if y1 = yd . The equilibrium prices are then given by the
equations
pd = yd (25)
and
 (1 + r   t)pu + (1  t)E [p2] + v0(1) = 0 (26)
Using our assumption that E [p2] = pd+ (1  )pu, we can now derive the e¤ect of a
marginal change in the capital gains tax rate t on housing prices:
dpd
dt
= 0
and
dpu
dt
=
(pu   yd)
(1  t) + r > 0:
It turns out that capital gains taxes raise house prices in high income states and do
not a¤ect house prices in low income states. Our example with uncertainty and credit
rationing thus conrms out earlier nding that capital gains taxes increase house price
uctuations.
4.4 Income growth
We close this section with some remarks on the implications of income growth in our
model. Imagine that the underlying rate of growth in the economy amounts to g, so that
the process of incomes over time could be, for example, :::; yd; yu(1+ g); yd(1+ g)2; yu(1+
g)3; :::. What would such an income process entail for the e¤ects of capital gains taxation?
First, without secular growth in income the government will essentially collect zero revenue
from a (symmetric) tax on capital gains on housing; neglecting discounting, what is
collected in one period is paid out in the subsequent period. With growth, on the contrary,
capital gains tend to more than o¤set capital losses, if any, enabling the government to
collect positive revenue over time. Whether the government simply keeps the revenue
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or pays it back to the private sector in one form or another will therefore inuence the
general level of house prices. Regardless of these considerations it is nevertheless possible
to demonstrate that the above tendency for capital gains taxation to increase house price
uctuations, suitably interpreted, will persist.
As an example, consider an economy with the same features as in subsection 3.1, except
that disregarding the business cycle income grows over time. In period zero, income is at
a level of yd; in period 1, it is yu(1 + g), and so forth. Any revenue from capital gains
taxation is kept with the government and not transferred back. Utilizing the method in
subsection 3.1 one can compute general expressions for house prices in boom and bust
periods (this we leave to the reader). Now use the same values for key parameters as in 3.1.
The rate of growth is g = 1=3 (again reecting a twenty-thirty year period length), and
the interest rate is r = 1 (now reecting growth on top of pure time preference). Without
taxation, house prices will in periods 1 to 3 lie at 40.8, 57.6, and 72.5, respectively. With a
50 percent capital gains tax, house prices in these three periods will instead be 31.8, 47.3,
and 56.5. We see that, as expected, the general level of house prices is lower with taxation.
But we also notice that from a bust period to the subsequent boom period, house prices
will increase by 41 percent without taxes, whereas with capital gains taxation the increase
will amount to 49 percent. In this sense, house price uctuations will continue to be more
dramatic under capital gains taxation.
5 Conclusions
This paper uses a simple OLG model to analyse the e¤ects of capital gains taxes on house
price uctuations and the user cost of housing. Capital gains taxes are widely thought to
dampen house price uctuations and to redistribute income from rich to poor households.
The results derived in this paper suggest that this view may be highly misleading. In
our model, it turns out that capital gains taxes increase house price uctuations and
redistribute income from the poor to the rich unless extreme assumptions on the use of
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the revenue from the capital gains tax are made. The reason is that households who buy
their real estate in boom phases will typically benet from the boom as far as their overall
income is concerned but they also buy their real estate at high prices. As a result, they
are likely to su¤er a capital loss when selling their houses later. Households who buy
their real estate in times of economic crisis, in contrast, have lower general income but
are likely to make a capital gain on their real estate investment. Introducing a capital
gains tax reduces the losses of the high income earners and reduces the capital gains of
low income earners. As a consequence, high (low) income earners will be able to pay more
(less), so that prices increase even further in booms and fall deeper in recessions.
Of course, these ndings emerge from a stylized model of the housing market which
abstracts from several complications which are potentially important. Firstly, we assume
that the supply of housing is xed. Although we think that our results would also hold
in a model with an upward sloping supply curve for housing services, the validity of
our results for the more general case of upward sloping supply curves remains to be
explored. Moreover, our analysis includes only a highly restrictive analysis of the case
with uncertainty about future income streams. Finally, there is no room in our model to
deal with the problem of accrual versus realisation based capital gains taxation. To the
extent that realization based capital gains taxes lead to lock in e¤ects, it is likely, though,
that price volatility increases further as the volume of trade declines.
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Table 1: Capital gains taxes on housing in EU countries (2001)
Belgium Y (turnover <5 years, exemption for owner-occupiers)
Denmark Y (tax exemptions for owner-occupiers)
Germany Y (turnover <10 years, tax exemptions for owner-occupiers)
Greece N
Spain Y (tax exemptions for principal dwellings when reinvested)
France Y (no tax for main residence)
Ireland Y (tax exemptions for principal dwellings)
Italy Y (50% tax reduction for pood), tax was abolished as from 2002)
Luxemburg Y (tax exemptions for principal dwellings)
Austria Y(turnover <10 years)
Netherlands N
Portugal Y (exemptions if proceeds are reinvested in another residence within 2 years)
Finland Y (exceptions for pood after 2 years)
Sweden Y(25%)
UK Y(tax exemption for pood)
Y: Yes
N: No
pood: pricipal owner-occupied dwelling
Source: European Central Bank (2003), Structural Factors in the EU Housing Market
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